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This paper investigates whether in OECD-countries the negative relation between central bank
independence and inflation is related to culture, in the sense of common values and norms. It
appears that inflation is lower in countries where people dislike uncertainty. The tolerance in a
society with regard to inequality in power and wealth and in centralization of authority is
correlated with central bank independence and to a lesser extent with inflation. Countries, where
inhabitants perceive that there should be an order of inequality and a centralisation of authority,
are characterised by a dependent central bank and relatively high inflation rates. Hence, the
national attitude towards inequality among people is the third factor explaining the negative
correlation between inflation and the degree of central bank independence.
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By now there is overwhelming empirical evidence (surveyed in Berger et al., 2000 and
Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996) supporting the proposition that in cross-country analyses
an independent central bank (measured by an index of legal independence) and low rates
of inflation are negatively correlated. Until recently this correlation was assumed to
confirm a causal relation from central bank independence to inflation rates. 
This causal relation running from central bank independence to inflation
performance has come under attack. It has been suggested that the negative correlation
between inflation and central bank independence is caused by a third factor. Candidates
for this third factor are the opposition of the financial sector against inflation (Posen,
1995), the nation’s degree of inflation aversion (Debelle, 1996), social cohesion (Prast,
1997), nation wide consensus (De Grauwe, 1998), and culture and tradition of monetary
stability (Berger et al., 2000 and Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). Empirical analysis has
been restricted to a large number of investigations of the influence of central bank
independence on inflation and a few studies on the determinants of central bank
independence (see for example, De Haan and Van ’t Hag, 1995; and Eijffinger and
Schaling, 1996, Moser, 1999).
As far as I know, only three empirical studies (Posen, 1995; Hayo, 1998; and
Moser, 1999) take the suggestion seriously that inflation and central bank independence
are (partly) determined by the same set of variables. In Posen’s study, this third factor
is the effective financial opposition to inflation. A crucial assumption of his approach
is that the financial sector dislikes inflation. Posen claims that the bankers’ vulnerability
to inflation is well established, although he admits that this attitude is not yet fully
explained (Posen, 1995, p. 257). On the contrary, recent studies find a positive (though
not always significant) relation between the net interest margin and bank profitability on
the one hand and inflation on the other (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998, pp. 19 and
20). Van Lelyveld (2000, Chapter 7), therefore, estimates the country specific influence
2of inflation on the commercial banks’ profitability. This sensitivity to inflation is
regarded as the banks’ preference for inflation and is used for improving the index of
Financial Opposition to Inflation (FOI). This ‘true’ FOI is strongly correlated with
inflation. Van Lelyveld interprets this empirical result as that a high level of inflation
forms an incentive for banks to lobby for a dependent central bank. Just the opposite
causal direction as put forward by Posen. Moreover, De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995)
finds only mixed support for Posen’s hypotheses.
Hayo (1998) introduces the concept of an inflation-culture, which in his view
leads to a national consensus on price stability and central bank independence. This
inflation culture will be the result of a historical feedback process where inflation
aversion and central bank independence reinforce each other. Hayo approximates
inflation aversion by means of the sensitivity of people’s preference for low inflation to
changes in the actual level of inflation. Various issues of the Eurobarometer are used for
estimating this sensitivity1. It appears that the proxies of inflation aversion have a
significant negative correlation with inflation. “The indicators of economic and political
independence of the central banks are positively correlated with the estimated sensitivity
parameters. In most cases, tough, this correlation is not significant” (Hayo, 1998, p.
258). His approach has two drawbacks. First, due to data limitations the analysis is
restricted to European countries and partial correlations. Second, his paper does not
provide a theory, which explains why in one country the historical feedback process
leads to low inflation and an independent central bank and in the other to high inflation
and a dependent central bank.
Moser (1999) argues that the level of independence of the central bank is  related
to the (non)existence of checks and balances between the decision bodies (parliamentary
                                                
1The Eurobarometer is a survey which is regularly conducted in all European Community
members countries. Generally around 1000 respondents are interviewed in each country.
3chambers, executive, or the people if a referendum exists) of the legislation. Countries
in which these bodies are independent of each other are characterised by an independent
central bank. Moreover, in these countries the independence of the central bank is also
more effective in reducing inflation than in countries with dependent central banks and
weak or no checks and balances. I agree with Moser that support by the political system
is important. A disadvantage of his approach is, however, that the checks and balances
argument refers to the relation between two bodies of the legislation, whereas central
bank independence refers to the relation between one of these bodies (the government)
and an specialised institute of the executive branch.
The present paper develops a theory on the impact of culture, in the sense of
common  values, on inflation and central bank independence. It appears that in theory
two cultural variables – Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance – have opposite
effects on inflation and central bank independence and thus are candidates for explaining
the negative correlation between the latter two. Power Distance reflects the extent to
which the inhabitants of a country accept that power is distributed unequally within the
society. Uncertainty Avoidance refers to the tolerance of uncertainty (ambiguity) which
can be found in people. An empirical analysis of 18 OECD-countries is employed to
investigate the relationship between these cultural dimensions and inflation and central
bank independence.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. The next section  presents a framework for
analysing the relation between culture, institutions and economic performance. In
Section 3 this framework is used for deriving relations between cultural characteristics
on the one hand and inflation and central bank independence on the other. The empirical







Central in this paper is the idea that culture, economic and political institutions, and
economic performance of a country are related. By culture I mean the collective
programming of mind, which distinguishes the members of one human group (country,
society) from another.2 Culture integrates the society in terms of common goals.3  A
culture is widely shared in a society and is transmitted from generation to generation.
Culture is learned and the more central and early-absorbed aspects of culture are resistant
to change. Findings of psychologists and physiologists (some references are provided
in Denzau and North, 1994) suggest that to a limited extent the structure of a person’s
mental model is genetic, but for the most part it is developed from the experience, and
constant re-evaluation of new experience. Mental models have a layered structure.
Deeper layers are more stable than the levels closer to the surface. The experience of
early childhood plays a crucial role in structuring these deeper levels. Hence, these layers
change gradually through intergenerational population replacement instead of conversion
of already socialised adults (Inglehart, 1997, p. 15). 
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3). They
structure the incentives in human exchange whether political, social or economic.
Institutions can be divided in formal institutions, such as written rules and legislation,
and informal institutions:  unwritten codes of conduct that underlie, supplement and
sometimes even substitute formal rules. In this paper the formal institutions are the laws
and regulation of  central banks and the informal ones are the practices of  monetary
policy.
The institutional framework of a society is a function of shared mental models
of its members (Denzau and North, 1994). Hence, culture will influence the production
                                                
2 Similar definitions can be found in  DiMaggio (1994, p.25), Hofstede (1981, p. 21) and
Inglehart (1990 and 1997).
3 The following is based on Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and DiMaggio(1994).
5process, the form and regulation of exchange and consumption (DiMaggio, 1994). For
example, several authors have argued that a market society requires and is succeeded by
a certain set of values, such as individualism and achievement. Within the group of
countries with a market economy, differences in state-society relations are deeply rooted
and the result of national history (see DiMaggio, 1994, p.38). In general, any stable
economic system has a compatible and supportive cultural system that legitimates that
system (Inglehart, 1997, p. 15)
The laws and codes of conduct in a society form an incentive structure, which
determines economic performance (Denzau and North, 1994, p. 27). The Structure-
Conduct-Performance Paradigm in industrial economics carries this idea to its extreme
(see Swedberg, 1994, p. 262). According to this paradigm the market structure  (number
of buyers and sellers, type of product) and public policy (taxes, regulation) constrain the
decisions of the firm (pricing, product strategy) which in its turn influences the
performance of an economy (unemployment, equality in income etc.). Values also
directly influence the outcome of the economic process. For example, societies, which
stress that in principle all people are equal, attach a higher value to an equal income
distribution.
To summarise, I postulate that culture influences economic performance both
directly and indirectly - by its impact on formal institutions (laws) and informal
institutions (codes of conduct). These institutions can be both economic and political.
In Figure 1 the arrows from left to right represent this causal ordering.
(insert Figure 1)
The causality also runs the other way, which is illustrated by the arrows from
right to left in Figure 1. The development of an economy will influence both
6institutions and culture. For example, the classic bureaucratic institutions of
industrial society which were part of the earlier stages of the industrial society
are inherently less effective in high technology societies with highly specialised
workforces. This explains their decline during recent decades (Inglehart, 1997).
The fall of the centralised economies of the formerly communist countries can
be ascribed to this increasing inefficiency of  hierarchical institutions. A less
dramatic example is that due to the low inflation rates in industrialised countries
with an independent central bank, the central banks in other countries are also
made more independent from political forces. The European Central Bank is
without doubt the best example in this respect.    
Economic structures and economic performance have an impact on values in a
society (see e.g. Bowles, 1998; and Inglehart, 1997). Central in Inglehart’s reasoning is
that values change in an intergenerational way. He assumes that people place the greatest
subjective value on those things that are in short supply; the scarcity hypothesis. The
values change gradually because one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed
during one’s pre-adult years. Although it usually changes slowly, culture can change
through the interaction with the environment, among which the economic situation in
a country is of primary importance. Ingelhart (1997) argues that the high level of income
per capita in the industrialized world has brought much certainty to the great majority
of the population. This has led to a large shift in values from those associated with the
level of living –such as achievement or hierarchy - to greater emphasis on the quality of
live.
Figure 1 summarises the relations and feedback mechanisms, which in my
opinion are relevant for studying the interaction between culture, institutions and
economic performance. the figure shows similarity with Figure 1 in Williamson (2000).
Culture corresponds with Williamson’s concept of  Embeddedness.  Figure 1 is very
7useful for comparing the present study with the other studies on the mechanism behind
the negative relation between inflation and central bank independence, mentioned in the
Introduction. Moser (1999) and De Haan and Van ‘t Hag (1995) emphasis the relation
between characteristics of the political system (checks and balances, political (in)stability
respectively) for the degree of central bank independence and inflation. Posen (1995)
and  Van Lelyveld (2000) argue that the independence of the central should be supported
by an important and effective lobby, in particular the financial system. So these studies
can be located on the right-hand side of the figure in that they stress the relation between
political and economic institutions, and the latter need support of the political system in
order to be effective. Prast (1997) mentions social cohesion, Hayo (1998) refers to the
relevance of values and Van Lelyveld (2000) preferences for central bank independence
and inflation. So these studies point at the relevance of values. In this respect Hayo
(1998) and this paper have much in common in that Hayo also refers to culture and the
importance of historical processes for developing a national culture. These studies do not
use direct measures of these values, although Hayo and Van Lelyveld derive measures
of inflation aversion from survey data. In the present study I use measures of cultural
dimensions to approximate the deeply rooted values and relate these to institutions (both





In order to find plausible links between culture, central bank independence and inflation,
I start on the right-hand side of Figure 1 and first describe the characteristics (effects)
of inflation and of the indices of central bank independence. Thereafter, the cultural
variables used are explained and related to the features of inflation and central bank
independence.
Inflation has many effects, which have been described by several authors (see
e.g. Briault, 1995, Driffill et al., 1990; Dowd, 1994). In theory, the various effects of
8anticipated inflation are well known and several measures can be taken to minimise their
negative effects (see Leigh-Pemperton, 1992, p. 444). Notwithstanding these theoretical
findings, Shiller’s opinion survey of public attitudes reveals that people do care about
various aspects of inflation (Shiller, 1997, p. 57, 58). Many of these aspects are related
to the uncertainty resulting from (unexpected) inflation (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997,
p. 106). It is this uncertainty which distorts the economic process in several ways. First,
long-term investments are hindered because the time horizon of economic agents is
shortened (see, e.g. Tommasi, 1999, p. 403), and a risk premium is demanded which
increases the real cost of funds. Secondly, uncertainty about future inflation may increase
the attractiveness of real as opposed to nominal assets because the former give a hedge
against inflation. As a consequence, inflation hurts those groups most, who are not able
to hedge themselves against the risk of rising prices. In general these groups are the poor,
so that inflation leads to a more unequal distribution of income in a country (Bulir, 1998;
Bulir and Gulde, 1995; and Romer and Romer, 1998). Dollar and Kraay (2000) even
conclude that avoidance of inflation in fact is “super-pro-poor”. Finally, inflation is
likely to distort the relative price signals, especially when inflation is high and
variable.4
Although the majority of the literature stresses the negative aspects of inflation,
at least two positive effects are also distinguished. First, there is the ‘oiling the wheels’
argument, which reads that a modest level of inflation is necessary for an appropriate
functioning of the relative price mechanism. Second, in countries with an inefficient
system for collecting taxes, the seigniorage associated with inflation is needed for
financing the budget.5
                                                
4 Many of the negative effects of inflation could be avoided by the introduction of an indexation
scheme. However, the costs of indexation can be high - it can lead to inefficiencies -, and it may
undermine the public support for an anti-inflationary policy (see Briault, 1995, p. 37; and
Feldstein, 1997, pp. 149-153).
5 Beetsma and Van der Ploeg (1996) argue that the income inequality and the amount of
9During the last decade, several indices for approximating the independence of
a central bank have been developed. Every index reflects the opinion of the author(s)
about the factors that in his view are important for the independence of the central bank.
Hence, subjective judgements will influence each index. Mangano (1998) shows that the
degree of subjectivity can be relatively high. In particular Forder (1998 and 1999) is very
sceptical in this respect. He concludes that since there is no objective reason to prefer
one index over the other, “there can be no test of the independence hypothesis” (Forder,
1999, p.29). Others find that the differences between the various indices do not change
the main conclusion of this literature, namely that in OECD countries a high level of
central bank independence is associated with a low inflation rate (De Haan, 1999,
Eijffinger et al., 1998). From this finding they conclude that although Forder has a point,
his conclusion is too far fetched (Berger et al., 2000, Section 5.1). I agree with the latter
authors and would add to it that implicitly Forder suggests that there is no dispute about
the empirical measures of other variables used in economic theory, which certainly is not
true. Moreover, I am not primarily interested in the best (if there is any) index of central
bank independence (CBI), but in explaining the empirical correlation between the CBI-
indices and inflation. Therefore, for this paper I have selected some indices, which are
very often used in studies that find a negative impact of central bank independence on
inflation.
The indices used are the index developed by Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman
et al. (1992)6, the one of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Alesina (1988) and
Eijfinger and Schaling (1992). Cukierman and his co-authors distinguish four clusters
                                                                                                                               
nominal government debt are the determining factors of  the seigniorage. Consequently,
inequality leads to inflation. For the present analysis the causality between inflation and
income inequality is not relevant. Relevant is that at least in OECD-countries inflation and
inequality are positively correlated, as is found in Beetsma and Van der Ploeg (1996) and
Romer and Romer (1998).
6Forder (1998)’s criticism of  obvious mistakes and doubtful judgements in constructing the
indices of central bank independence does not refer to this index.
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of issues of the legal characteristics of a central bank: (a) the central bank’s objective,
(b) the rules regarding appointment, dismissal, and term of office of the chief executive
officer of the bank, (c) policy formation, and (d) the limitations on the ability of the
central bank to lend to the public sector. An independent central bank is one for which
(a) the charter prescribes price stability as the only or main goal, (b) the legal term of
office of the chief executive officer is long and the executive branch has little legal
authority in appointing and dismissing the governor, (c) there is a wide authority to
formulate monetary policy and to resist the executive branch in case of conflict, and (d)
the limits on its lending to the public sector are tight.
Grilli, Masciandari and Tabellini (1991, pp. 366-371) make a distinction
between  political independence and economic independence of the central bank.
Political independence is the capacity to choose the  of monetary policy, such
as inflation or the level of economic activity. Three aspects of the monetary regime are
considered to be important: (a) the procedure for appointing the members of the central
bank governing bodies; (b) the relationship between these bodies and the government;
and (c) the formal responsibilities of the central bank. The political independence of a
central bank is greater if  (a) the appointments are not under control of the government
and are for a long period; (b) prior government approval of monetary policy is not legally
required; and (c) the constitution considers preserving monetary stability as a policy goal
and provides a transparent procedure for how a conflict between the central bank and the
government is to be resolved. Economic independence is the capacity to choose the
	

	 with which to pursue the goals, and reflects (a)  the influence of the
government in determining how much to borrow from the central bank and (b) the nature
of the monetary instruments under control of the central bank. A central bank is more
independent if direct credit to the government is non-automatic, at market interest rates,
temporary and in a limited amount. The nature of monetary instruments refers the
11
control of the discount rate and banking supervision. An independent central bank
controls the discount rate and has no responsibility for bank supervision.
The index by Alesina (1988) and that by Eijffinger and Schaling (1992) measure
in different ways the political independence as discussed above with respect to the
GMT-index; the ability of the central bank to select its policy objectives without
influence of the government. The index by Alesina is based on the work by Bade and
Parkin. Alesina extends four countries to the twelve countries considered by Bade and
Parkin. Differences between ES and AI are caused by different interpretations of some
national laws and practice and by a different weighing of the criteria. As GMT, Alesina
derives his index by summing the individual scores on the different aspects. Hence each
item has an equal weight in the index. As Cukierman c.s., Eiffinger and Schaling try to
approximate the relative importance of each item by assigning different weights to the
items. A summary of this interpretation effect and criterion effect are listed in Eijffinger
and Schaling (1993), Table 5.
Summarising this brief overview of  indices of central bank independence, I
conclude that the index by Cukierman c.s. and that by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
are relatively broad and contain two main dimensions namely: price stability and
independence. The indices by Alesina and by Eijffinger and Schaling measure
independence only. The motives for including price stability in the central bank’s charter
are the same as those for striving for price stability. The other characteristics refer to the
legal ability of the government to influence the policy of the central bank. Note that all
indices stress the relation between the central bank and the government and do not pay
attention to the relation between the government and the parliament.7 The task is then
                                                
7 The legislative branch is only referred to when measuring the resolution of conflicts. This
index is one of the 16 indices used for deriving the index of central bank independence. See
Cukierman (1992), Table 19.1.
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to discover the variable(s) that can explain the differences between countries in degree
of dependence of institutions on the executive branch.
The cultural variables used, are those, which Hofstede (1980) derived from a
survey on work-related values among employees of IBM in 40 countries. The survey was
conducted from 1968 to 1973. Researchers from different Western countries formulated
the questions of the survey in order to avoid a national bias. Factor analysis has been
applied to this data set of over 116,000 questionnaires to determine the values that
explain the differences between national cultures. Four factors are found: Power
Distance, Individualism, Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance. The countries used
in the present study all score high on the individualism index, so that it is implausible
that individualism will contribute to an explanation of the differences in institutions and
economic performance in these countries.8 I therefore only describe the three remaining
factors.  
Power Distance (PDI) refers to the extent to which the society accepts that
power, within its organisations and the society as a whole, is distributed unequally.9 In
societies with large Power Distance people perceive that here should be an order of
inequality in which everybody has a rightful place, and such an order provides the best
protection for everyone. In societies with a low score on Power Distance an inequality
of roles is established only for convenience. The score on PDI  is positively correlated
with (a) an unequal distribution of income (Hofstede, 1980, p.98), (b) political violence
(ibid, p.103), (c) a centralisation of political power and political strength (ibid, pp. 97
and 98), and (d) the Aston dimension of “concentration of authority” (ibid, p. 106). For
example, in European countries that score high on PDI the expenditures and
employment by local governments is much lower than in countries with a low score on
                                                
8 Moreover, in a previous version of this paper, I argue that it is not plausible that
individualism has any relation with the issue at hand.  
9 Power Distance refers to a characteristic of social systems and not of individuals (Hofstede,
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PDI. Moreover, in the former countries localities have fewer functions and more detailed
control exerted on them (Page and Goldsmith, 1987). An unequal income distribution
is associated with a high inflation rate (see among others Dollar and Kraay, 2000 and
Beetsma and Van der Ploeg,  1996), and a high score on PDI reflects more acceptance
of inequality. I, therefore, expect a positive relation between PDI and inflation. The
tendency in high PDI countries to centralise political power suggests that in these
countries central banks will be dependent; PDI and central bank independence are
negatively correlated.
The second factor of national culture is Uncertainty Avoidance (UA). “The main
underlying dimension is the tolerance for uncertainty (ambiguity) which can be found
in individuals and which leads some individuals in the same situation to perceive a
greater need for action for overcoming the uncertainty than others" (Hofstede, 1980, p.
118).  People in societies with a high score on Uncertainty Avoidance perceive
uncertainty as a continuous threat that must be fought. In these countries people take less
risk and are to a larger extent dependent on authorities. In these societies one tries to
reduce the uncertainty by means of legislation, formal rules and specialisation (see
Hofstede, 1980, pp. 135 and 142). Inhabitants of countries with a low score on UA
accept uncertainty inherent in life much more easily. They take more risk and tend to
have a stronger feeling of citizens’ competence versus authorities, whose reason of
existence is perceived as service to citizens. Since a major effect of unanticipated
inflation is an increase in uncertainty, I expect a negative relationship between
Uncertainty Avoidance and inflation.10 Because the objective of monetary policy forms
part of the Cukierman-index and the index by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, for
these indices Uncertainty Avoidance might also have a positive effect on central bank
                                                                                                                               
1980, p. 76).
10 Note that this is a cross-country analysis, where each observation is the average of a
variable during at least one decade. Hence, short-term relations as the Phillips-curve are not
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independence. Moreover, countries with a high score on Uncertainty Avoidance are
characterised by specialisation and formal rules, which corresponds with an independent
central bank. Hence, there might also be a positive relation between Uncertainty
Avoidance and the two other indices, although this effect is expected to be of less
importance.
The last factor is Masculinity-Femininity (MAS). It measures to what extent
respondents in a country (of both sexes) tend to endorse goals usually more popular
among men (high MAS) or among women (low MAS). Important goals for people in a
masculine society are advancement, earnings, and freedom. In countries with a high
score on the masculinity index, achievement is defined in terms of status and wealth,
salary is preferred to shorter working hours, men and women follow different types of
higher education and economic growth is regarded as important (Hofstede, 1980, Figure
6.3 and Figure 6.6).  Feminine societies stress equality and solidarity; managers strive
for consensus. Hofstede, however, does not report a relation between inequality in
income and the masculinity index. Because of the emphasis in feminine countries on
equality, it might be that there is a positive relation between masculinity and inflation.
Although, I expect that Power Distance will dominate Masculinity in these regressions.
In his list of connotations of Masculinity, Hofstede only indirectly refers to factors that
can be related to the effects on the degree of central bank independence. Moreover, in
his study of industrial relations, Semenov (2000, Section 6.5) finds that centralised
bargaining took place in relative feminine countries, which suggests that in feminine
countries there is more collusion of power. This would imply that feminine countries
have dependent central banks and low inflation, which is opposite to the empirical
evidence found in many studies. I, therefore, do not expect a relation between
                                                                                                                               
relevant. 
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Masculinity and central bank independence. Nevertheless, in the empirical part I will
check whether this assertion is correct.
From the discussion presented above I derive the following hypotheses:

		: Inflation is high in countries that score high on Power Distance and low
on Uncertainty Avoidance.

		: Central banks are relative more dependent in countries, which have a high
score on Power Distance and a low score on Uncertainty Avoidance.

		 : There is at best a weak positive relation between Masculinity and
inflation.

		: There is no relation between Masculinity and central bank independence
As these hypotheses show, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance both have an
opposite effect on inflation and the degree of central bank independence. So, in principle




4.1 Some methodological issues
Before proceeding to the data and empirical results, I discuss two methodological issues,
namely the causality and the way I deal with outliers.
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As Figure 1 illustrates, values, institutions and economic performance interact
with each other so that in principle the direction of the causality is difficult to be
determined. Nevertheless, I think that in this study it is more likely that causality runs
from culture through institutions to economic performance than the other way round. In
general, causality has at least three features: there must be a statistical association
between two variables, the independent variable (the ‘cause’) must temporally precede
the dependent variable (the ‘effect’), and  the association between the two variables may
not be the result of a ‘third’ variable. The statistical association is revealed by means of
the t-statistic and the F-statistic.
As is common usage in social research, the validity of causal relations is
evaluated at the basis of relative fixity or alterability of the variables: the suggested cause
– values - should be less alterable than the suggested effect – institutions and economic
performance (e.g. Punch, 1998). As is argued in Section 2, there are many theoretical
and empirical arguments in favour of the hypothesis that values change more slowly than
central bank laws and inflation, certainly during such a short period as is considered
here. This argument is reinforced by Williamson (2000) who argues that culture (which
he labels Embeddedness) changes very slowly – on the order of centuries or millennia.
 Moreover, the cultural values are derived from questionnaires that were held in the years
1968 to 1973, whereas the observations of the other variables start in 1972.
The third criterion – that there is no ‘third’ variable - is met if the cultural
variables are constant during long periods of time and they represent deeply rooted
values in the societies. In order to investigate whether the factors found are deeply rooted
in the tradition of the societies, Hofstede relates the dimensions of culture to various
factors and to results found by other researchers. He finds that Power Distance and
Masculinity are highly correlated with geographical latitude - which is a proxy for
climate - and to a lesser extent with the size of a country. Uncertainty Avoidance appears
to be associated with the date of establishing a democratic regime; young democracies
17
tend to show higher scores on UA. They acquired their present form of government after
a war in which they played a more or less aggressive role (Hofstede, 1980, 133).
Moreover, high scores on Uncertainty Avoidance coincide with occupation during the
Roman Empire. Hence, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are likely to be deeply rooted in
the societies. A conclusion which is reaffirmed by many other studies on work-related
values (see Chinese Cultural Connection, 1987; Smith et al. 1994; and Smith et al.
1996).
Outliers frequently occur in cross-section analysis of various countries. As is well
known, outliers lead to heteroskedastic disturbances and thus to inefficient estimates of
 the coefficients and biased estimates of the corresponding variances (Judge et al., 1980,
p. 127). Some studies drop these observations (see, e.g. Temple, 1998; Romer and
Romer, 1998; and Beetsma and Van der Ploeg, 1996). I agree with Sturm and De Haan
(2000) that the use of a robust regressions method is to be preferred. The estimators of
such a technique are not strongly affected by outliers (also known as influential
observations).  I use the method proposed in Welsch (1980). This procedure consists of
two steps. First, it investigates whether there are any influential observations. An
observation is influential if it has a combination of values of dependent variables
substantially different from the rest  it has a large influence on the fit of the
regression. If there are no influential observations then the equation is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares. In case influential observations are found, Weighted Least
Squares is applied, where the influential observations have a weight less than one. The
Jarque-Bera test is used for investigating the normality of the disturbances. The Obs*r-
squared statistic of White (without cross terms) is used for testing the homoskedasticity




The previous sections have concentrated on the possible links between the three
dimensions of culture and the institutional design of a country. The negative relation
between the level of inflation and central bank independence has been found for
industrial countries.11 The empirical part of this study is therefore restricted to 18
industrialised countries for which observations for almost all variables are available.12
The equations are estimated for the period 1972-1989. The cultural variables are from
Hofstede (1980). The inflation rates are the changes in consumer price indices as
published in the IMF, International Financial Statistics (line 65). The indices of central
bank independence are from Cukierman et al. (1992), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991), Alesina (1988) and Eijfinger and Schaling (1992). Table 1 shows the data on the
cultural dimensions, inflation and central bank independence for the 18 countries
considered. As the table illustrates for a few countries there are no data available of some
indices of central bank independence. For example three Scandinavian countries are not
considered in the calculation of the index by Grilli c.s.. In these cases the analysis is
restricted to the countries for which data are available.
(insert Table 1)
                                                
11 
 See, Cukierman et al.(1992) and Campillo and Miron (1997). For developing countries the
relation found is between inflation and the turn-over of the Chief Executive Officer of the
central bank (Cukierman et al., 1992, p. 373).
12
 These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany,  Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Iceland is not in our sample because
the cultural variables are not available. Temple (1998) shows that Iceland is an outlier, which
has a large effect on the results. Hence, although it is by accident, the sample reduces the
problems associated with heteroskedasticity.   
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4.3 Cultural influences on inflation
When regressing inflation on the three cultural variables and a constant term, the
coefficients of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance have the correct sign but are
insignificantly different from zero (upper part of Table 2, column 1). Uncertainty
Avoidance shows the highest absolute value of the t-statistic, which suggests that
Uncertainty Avoidance is the most important cultural variable. 
(insert Table 2)
This basic equation gives a first impression only. It might be that the estimated
parameters are biased due to missing variables. In case this is a downward bias of the
absolute value of the coefficient the bias might also reduce the t-statistic.13 A procedure
to avoid this missing-variables bias, would be to include in the regression as many as
possible explanatory variables and subsequently delete the most insignificant ones.
However due to the limited number of observations and consequently, the limited
degrees of freedom, such a procedure is impossible. I therefore, subsequently add one
variable to the basic relation. In this way the robustness of the effects is tested too.
Variables added to the relation are those suggested in other studies on cross-country
analyses of inflation (in particular, Heylen and Van Poek, 1996; Romer, 1993; Moser,
1999; and Campillo and Miron, 1997). Variables which will be considered are:14 the
                                                
13 Missing variables lead to a biased estimate and smaller variance of the estimated
coefficient. Since the t-statistic is the ratio of the mean and standard deviation of the estimated
coefficient, a relatively large downward bias (in absolute value) might more than compensate
the smaller variance. See, Judge et al. (1980), p. 408.
14 Campillo and Miron (1997) also include into their analysis a variable labeled “quality of the
data”. This variable has the same value for all countries, except for Switzerland. Hence,
including quality of the data in the list of regressors would amount to a country-dummy for
Switzerland. I therefore have not considered this variable. The sources of the other variables
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degree of central bank independence (-), average inflation rate from the pre-sample
period as a measure of the taste for inflation(+), log of income per capita (-), political
instability measured by the number changes of the government (+) and by the number
of significant government changes (+), the political colour of the government (Left, +),
government debt as a percentage of GDP (+), the exchange rate system (+), openness (-),
and the extent to which the legislative function is shared by different bodies. The signs
between brackets indicate the theoretically expected signs of the coefficients. The extent
to which the legislative function is shared by different bodies is from Moser (1999) and
is represented by three dummy variables: strong, weak and no checks and balances. The
sum of these three variables equals one so that the intercept (or one of these variables)
has to be deleted from the regression in order to avoid singularity of the regression
matrix. It is expected that more checks and balances are correlated with lower inflation
rates. The variables on checks and balances in the legislative system and that on central
bank independence are institutional constraints and thus makes part of the box
“Institutions” in Figure 1, the other variables belong to the box “Performance”. Inflation
is also a performance variable. The cultural dimensions, however, belong to the box
“Culture” and change much more slowly than the institutional and performance variables
(see Section 4.1 and Williamson, 2000). Hence, I expect that in the regression analysis
                                                                                                                               
are the following. The number of policy changes and the number of significant government
changes in the period 1980 to 1989 are from De Haan and Van ‘t Hag (1995), who derived
them from Keesing’s Histrocial Archives and Bank’s Handbook of the World, respectively.
The variable on checks and balances in the legislative function is from Moser (1999). Left is
the variable representing the political colour of a government and is also from Table 6.A.2 in
Alesina et al. (1997). This variable classifies governments either as left- or right-wing. The
time series of annual data is one for a left-wing government and zero for a right-wing one. The
variable Left used in the regressions is the weighted average over the sample period, where the
weights are equal to the number of years (as a percentage of the total) a left (right) wing
government has been in office during the period concerned. Exchange rate system: this
variable ranges from 0 for fixed exchange rates to 2 for fully flexible exchange rates. The
classification is from the IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. The variable is the average for the period 1972 to 1989. Openness is measured by
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the performance variables are more significant than the institutional variables which in
their turn are likely to be more significant than the cultural dimensions. Consequently,
even if the cultural variables would appear to be less significant than the other variables,
in my opinion this would not necessarily imply that they do not play any role.
Given the central place of central bank independence in this study the influence
of central bank independence on inflation is considered separately, see Tables 3 and 4.
The regressions with the cultural dimensions and one additional factor  (other then
central bank independence) as explanatory variables are presented in Table 2. All
regressions contained influential observations, so that weighted least squares is used. As
columns 2 through 10 of Table 2 show, Uncertainty Avoidance has a significant
coefficient in five out of ten cases, and Power Distance and Masculinity each three out
of ten regressions.15 This confirms our impression that for inflation Uncertainty
Avoidance is the most important cultural dimension.16 The relevance of Power Distance
for inflation is lower than I expected (see Hypothesis 1) and that of Masculinity is higher
than I had thought at forehand (Hypothesis 3). Combining these results, I conclude that
based on statistical significance for inflation Uncertainty Avoidance is the primary
cultural factor and that a tolerance for inequality and centralisation of authority -
measured by Power Distance or Masculinity - is of secondary importance.
In order to obtain an idea of the robustness of the results, regressions have been
run in which two variables were added to the basic relation.17 The range of  the P-values
                                                                                                                               
the average share of imports in GDP.   
15 Note that in almost all cases where the coefficient is statistically significant, the absolute
value of the parameter is much larger than in the basic relation. This illustrates the importance
of biased estimates due to missing variables (see note 14). Sometimes the differences in
absolute value are not that large or the absolute value of the significant coefficient is even
smaller than in the basic relation (see Uncertainty Avoidance in column (a)). This is due to the
fact that weighted least squares is employed, with different weights for each regression. 
16 Romer (1993) also finds that the coefficient of openness is very insignificant.
17 In this respect the variables on the checks and balances within the legislative function are
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of the cultural variables is listed in Table 2, Part B. These P-values reaffirm the
conclusion that based on statistical significance Uncertainty Avoidance is the most
robust cultural factor explaining cross-country differences in inflation between OECD-
countries; many P-values are in the range of 1% to 5% and the maximum P-value is
16%.
(insert table 3)
Before presenting the results of the results of the multiple regressions of central bank
independence along with cultural variables on inflation, Table 3 gives partial
correlations between the different (sub)indices of central bank independence and
inflation. Let us first concentrate on the four main indices. Then it appears that the
correlation between the Cukierman-index and the GMT-index is relatively high (0.79),
whereas the first has a correlation of 0.62 with Alesina-index and 0.55 with the E&S
index. The index by Eijffinger and Schaling is quite different from the others: the
correlation coefficient ranges from 0.69 (with the index of Alesina) to 0.38 with the
index of Grilli c.s.. The low correlation with the GMT-index can partly be ascribed to
the fact that the common set of  these two indices consists of fourteen countries only.
The relatively low correlation between E&S-index and the indices of Cukierman and that
of Alesina is not due to large differences in countries concerned; the sets differ with
respect to one country only. The aim of this paper is to explain the negative correlation
between central bank independence (CBI) and inflation found in many empirical studies
(see e.g. Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996, Section 4.1 and Berger et al., 2000). Hence, it
is crucial that in the present sample this correlation is negative and significant. Except
for the Cukierman-index on appointment, the correlation between an index and inflation
                                                                                                                               
considered as one variable.
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is negative (Table 3, last column). For most indices the t-statistic of the coefficient of
central bank independence is statistically significant in the regression of inflation on
central bank independence and an intercept (last row of Table 3). Exceptions are
Cukierman’s sub-indices on appointment and conservative and the GMT-index on
political independence. Hence for the majority of indices there is a negative relation
between central bank independence and inflation.
(insert Table 4)
As in De Haan and Kooi (1997, Table 2) the indices of appointment, financial and
conservative do not have a significant impact on inflation (Table 4). The coefficients of
the other indices are statistically significant, and thus confirm the widely held result that
an independent central bank is associated with low rates of inflation. The regressions
where central bank independence is represented by the total index of Cukierman and
GMT confirm the results from Table 2 that Uncertainty Avoidance and tolerance of
differences within society - measured by Masculinity or Power Distance – are the
important cultural dimensions. Once again the relevance of Power Distance is less and
that of Masculinity more than I had expected at forehand. Uncertainty Avoidance is also
statistically significant for the GMT-indices on political and economic independence.
For the latter Masculinity and Power Distance are statistically significant too. In the
regressions with the sub-indices of Cukierman’s index, Masculinity is statistically
significant in two out of five cases and the coefficients of the other cultural variables are
never significant. No cultural variables are statistically significant in the regression with
the index of Alesina or that Eijffinger and Schaling.
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4.4 Cultural values and central bank independence
No influential observations were found in the regressions for central bank independence
when measured by Cukierman’s index. Power distance appears to be the most important
cultural factor in explaining the degree of independence of the central bank (Part A of
Table 5, column 1). Although, maybe due to the missing variables bias, its coefficient
is still insignificant in the OLS regression. In order to investigate the consequences of
missing variables and the robustness of this result, I have subsequently added to this
basic relation one of the explanatory variables included in De Haan and Van’t Hag
(1995) and Moser (1999).18 De Haan and Van’t Hag argue that a central bank will be
more independent the higher the motivation for increasing inflation due to a high
equilibrium unemployment rate or a high debt/GDP ratio. Political instability will lead
to a dependent central bank. Political instability is proxied by the frequency of
government changes during the 1980s (Change) and the frequency of significant
government changes, i.e., when another party (or coalition) comes into power
(Significant).19 I have added the exchange rate system to their list of variables. The
reason is that often both fixed exchange rates and an independent central bank are
mentioned as devices by which monetary policy can be shielded from political
influences. Hence in an anti-inflationary policy they can serve as substitutes for each
                                                
18 I have not included the variables put forward by Hayo (1998), Posen (1995) and Van
Lelyveld (2000). The reason is that these studies consider a smaller number of countries than I
do. Hence, comparing the results of regressions with these variables with those of the other
regressions would introduce a selection bias.
19 De Haan and Van’t Hag also mention that high inflation in a previous period can increase
the preferences for low inflation rates and thus for an independent central bank. They do not
report these prices for all countries concerned. Therefore, I have not added the inflation of the
period before the Second World War in the regressions. The sources of the variables not
derived from IMF publications and not listed in note 14 are the following. Equilibrium
unemployment rate for the 1970s and 1980s: Layard, Nickel and Jackman (1991, p. 436).
Average inflation from 1900-1940: Maddison (1991). 
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other.20  Finally, the variables on checks and balances between the decision bodies of the
legislative function are considered. Countries with stronger checks and balances are
expected to have a more independent central bank.
(insert Table 5)
As columns 2 trough 7 of Part A of Table 5 show, Power Distance is the most important
cultural dimension for explaining the degree of central bank independence, although its
coefficient is only significant in two out of six regressions.
The coefficients of Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity are always
insignificant. Therefore, Part B of Table 5 reports the results for the regressions with
Power Distance as the only cultural dimension. Then Power Distance has a significant
impact in five out if seven cases.  In both sets of regressions the exchange rate regime
and the variables on checks and balances are the only additional variables that have a
significant impact on central bank independence. Moreover, as expected the magnitude
of the coefficient of the checks and balances dummies show that the central bank is more
independent in countries where the legislative function is shared by different bodies. The
fact that both Power Distance and checks and balances are statistically significant in both
regressions, suggests that the relation between the different legislative bodies and that
between the government and the executive institutions is relevant. In countries where the
legislative bodies share responsibilities, the government delegates authority to
independent institutes. Of course, this finding is perfectly in line with the idea of 
                                                
20  One can argue that the size of the country is also relevant: for a large country it is mostly
politically less opportune to peg its currency to that of a small one (see Mishkin, 1999, p. 12).
Hence, size might also be an explanatory variable. I did not include size in the list of
explanatory variables because size is correlated with Power Distance (see Hofstede, 1980, 95-
98). 
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embeddedness, which can be regarded as claiming that the character of the institutions
in one area should correspond with that in another field of the society.
In order to investigate the robustness of the finding that based on statistical
significance Power Distance is the dominant cultural factor, regressions are run in which
two variables are added to the basic equation. The P-values of the coefficients of Power
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance are presented in Part C of Table 2. They confirm
that the level of central bank independence is correlated with by Power Distance; almost
half of the P-values is smaller than 1% and the maximum value is 14%. Uncertainty
Avoidance doesn’t play any role. Hence Hypothesis 2 is confirmed with regard to power
Distance and rejected for the expected impact of Uncertainty Avoidance. If Masculinity
is included (regressions not shown), its coefficients is often insignificant and has the
wrong sign. This affirms my prior that Masculinity is not relevant (Hypothesis 4 in
Section 3).
In order to shed more light on the source of these results, Tables 6 –10 present
the regressions in which one or more sub-indices are the independent variables. The
results are very
(insert Tables 6 – 10)
diverse with regard to the cultural variables. Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and
Masculinity all are significant in some regressions. It is very remarkable that, except for
the intercept, Masculinity is the only variable, which sometimes has a significant impact
on the appointment-index (Table 6). Moreover, its coefficient is positive, indicating that
a high score on Masculinity is correlated with long legal terms of office and limited legal
authority for the executive branch to dismiss the governor. It should be noted however
that the R2(adjusted) is very low for all regressions of the appointment-index. The
instrument-variable – measuring the independence of the central bank with respect to
27
policy-making - is significantly associated with Power Distance and Uncertainty
Avoidance (Table 7 part A). One of the checks and balances variables is the only
variable that also has a significant coefficient. Since the coefficient of Masculinity is
never significant in any regression, I have also run regressions without this variable
(Table 7, part B). Then Uncertainty Avoidance is always significant and Power Distance
is significant in three out of seven regressions. The debt to GDP ratio also appears to
have a significant impact. So in both regressions the cultural dimensions Power Distance
and Uncertainty Avoidance are the most important explanatory variables. This result
underscores the idea that inhabitants of countries with a high level of Uncertainty
Avoidance prefer independent specialised institutions, and (to a lesser extent) that low
Power Distance is associated with sharing of authority.  The index of financial
independence is determined by variables representing the political system – (significant)
changes of government and checks and balances – and in the specification with the
checks and balances variable also by Power Distance (Table 8). It appears that
conservative (the legal objective of the central bank) cannot be explained by the set of
variables considered (Table 9). All R-squared are low and there is only one specification
in which the coefficients of two variables are significant: Power Distance and the
equilibrium level of unemployment. One can argue that the index on conservativeness
reflects the legal goal of the central bank and that the three other indices (appointment,
instrument and financial) reflect the independence. It therefore makes sense to
investigate the determinants of the index consisting of the sum of the latter three. The
overall fit of this relation is much better than that of the individual indices. Significant
variables appear to be Masculinity, Power Distance, the exchange rate mechanism, and
variables reflecting the political system: changes of government and checks and balances
(see Table 10). The coefficient of Masculinity is positive, whereas I expected no
significant influence (Hypothesis 4). As discussed above, this is due to the positive
relation between Masculinity and the index on appointment (Table 6).
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(insert Tables 11-13)
The cultural dimensions hardly have any effect on the GMT-index of central bank
independence (Table 11) and the two sub-indices on political (Table 12) and economic
(Table 13) independence. Out of 24 regressions, the coefficient of Power Distance is
significant in only one case, that of Masculinity in two cases and that of Uncertainty
Avoidance in three cases of which two are wrongly signed. The variables reflecting the
political situation – (significant) change of government, and checks and balances
between the legislative bodies – fare better in explaining the independence of the central
bank. It might be that this large difference in results between using Cukierman’s index
and the GMT-index results from the differences in countries covered by each index. I
therefore have re-estimated the relations with the Cukierman- index for the countries
used in the regressions with the GMT-index. It appears (results not shown) that Power
Distance and to a lesser extent Uncertainty Avoidance are even more significant in these
regressions than in those shown in Table 5, Part A. Hence, the difference in results have
to be ascribed to the different ways the two indices of central bank independence are
constructed. 
(insert Tables 14)
Each cultural variable has one significant coefficient in case Alesina’s index of central
bank independence is used (Table 14). Masculinity once again has a positive coefficient.
Of the other variables only debt/GDP and the dummy for countries with no checks and
balances have a significant coefficient. In general, it appears to be difficult to explain the
Alesina-index by means of the set of variables considered.
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(insert Table 15)
For the index of Eijfinger and Schaling, the best results are obtained when the cultural
dimensions are supplemented by the variable measuring significant changes of the
government (Table 15). In that case all variables have a significant impact, the cultural
dimensions are correctly signed, whereas the variable on government changes is not. The
regression with the exchange rate system is also relatively good. The other regressions
results are poor. It is remarkable that the regression with the dummies on checks and
balances between the legislative bodies is very poor indeed, whereas for the other indices
this specification mostly shows the best results. For six countries the Eijfinger and
Schaling index is based on relatively new central bank laws (see Eijfinger and De Haan
(1996, Table 2, note b). This might partly explain the differences in results between this
index and the others. Austria is one of these six countries and appeared to be a very
influential observation.
(insert Table 16)
In order to derive an overall conclusion, I have listed in Table 16 for each explanatory
variable, the number of cases that the corresponding coefficient appeared to be
significant and whether the sign of this significant coefficient was in accordance with
the sign expected from theory. Within the group of cultural dimensions, both Power
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance have 16 rightly signed significant coefficients.
Power Distance does not show any significant coefficient with a wrong sign. Uncertainty
Avoidance has two wrongly signed significant effects. Moreover, the significant
coefficients for Uncertainty Avoidance are concentrated in the regressions with
instrument independence of Cukierman as the dependent variable (11of the 16
significant coefficients). If significant, Power Distance always has the right sign.
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Furthermore, for every group of indices Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance 
appear to have a significant effect in at least one regression. By far the majority of the
significant coefficients of Masculinity have a positive sign, whereas I expected no
relation (see Hypothesis 4). From these results I conclude that Power Distance and
Uncertainty Avoidance are the most relevant cultural dimensions for explaining central
bank independence. These factors represent the attitude towards concentration of
authority and the desire to use specialised institutions, respectively. 
Of the set of conditioning variables, only the variables on checks and balances
between the legislative bodies frequently influence the central bank independence
significantly. For the (sub)-indices of the Cukierman-index, Power Distance is often also
significant in the regressions with the checks and balances variables.
.)
	
By now there is a large amount of empirical evidence of a negative correlation between
central bank independence and inflation. In general this correlation is interpreted as
causation from central bank independence to inflation. Recently, however, many authors
question this causation running from central bank independence to inflation. Critics
argue that there could be a third factor explaining the negative relation between central
bank independence and inflation. In this paper I investigate the suggestion that culture
in the sense of common values is this third factor. In this respect the cultural dimensions
of Hofstede are used. I argue that Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance are the
cultural dimensions that could serve as this third factor. Countries which score high on
power distance are also characterized by an unequal distribution of income (which can
be a result of inflation), and a centralization of political power. The latter results in
institutions which highly dependent on the central government. Power Distance,
therefore, is expected to be positively correlated with inflation and negatively with
central bank independence. Inflation leads to uncertainty, so that we expect inflation to
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be low in countries in which the inhabitants see uncertainty as a thread. Another
characteristic of countries that score high on Uncertainty Avoidance is a preference for
specialized institutions, which are independent from the government. As a result,
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to be negatively correlated with inflation and
positively with central bank independence. 
These hypotheses are tested for eighteen OECD-countries for which data are
available. In these countries cross-country differences in inflation appear to be related
to the attitude of people with regard to uncertainty; inflation is lower in countries where
people dislike uncertainty.  The tolerance of inequality in the society (reflected in the
Power Distance or Masculinity) appears to be of less importance. The degree of
independence of the central bank is correlated with Power Distance and Uncertainty
Avoidance. The good results of the latter are almost entirely resulting from the
regressions with the instrument independence of Cukierman as the dependent variable.
For every index of central bank independence considered, Power Distance has at least
one regression with a significant and rightly signed coefficient. Moreover, in no
regression Power Distance shows a significant and wrongly signed coefficient. From this
I conclude that although bot Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance are important
cultural variables correlated with central bank independence, Power Distance is the most
important one. Thus, the extent to which one is willing to share authority in the society
is slightly more important than the preference for specialized institutions. In accordance
with the sharing-authority-argument, the extent to which the legislative bodies share
equally the legislative function appears to be important too. The exchange rate
mechanism is the only other factor relevant for central bank independence; central banks
are more independent in countries with flexible exchange rates.
These results confirm the hypothesis that cultural dimensions matter. However,
at first sight there is not one single dimension that dominates in the sense that it is the
most important cultural factor correlated with both inflation and central bank
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independence. Both Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance appear to be relevant.
A closer look reveals, however, that the tolerance of inequality with respect to income,
wealth and authority is in all likelihood the best candidate for the common third factor
behind inflation and central bank independence. Although, Uncertainty Avoidance is the
most important cultural dimension related with inflation, a measure correlated with the
acceptance of differences in authority and inequality – Power Distance, Masculinity - is
often also significant. Power Distance is significantly correlated with central bank
independence. Hence, I conclude that in all likelihood the acceptance of differences in
authority and inequality – mostly represented by Power Distance and sometimes by
Masculinity - is the best candidate for being the factor correlated with inflation and
central bank independence. Of less importance but still relevant is that countries with a
low acceptance of uncertainty are associated with low levels of inflation and specialized
institutions, such as independent central banks.
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Cultural Dimensions Inflation Central bank independence
Country PDI MAS UAI Cuk GMT AI ES 
Australia 36 61 51 9.58 0.36 9 1 1
Austria 11 79 70 5.02 0.61 9 3
Belgium 65 54 94 6.22 0.17 7 2 3
Canada 39 52 48 7.37 0.45 11 2 1
Denmark 18 16 23 8.31 0.50 8 2 4
Finland 33 26 59 9.34 0.28 2 3
France  68 43 86 8.42 0.24 7 2 2
Germany 35 66 65 3.85 0.69 13 4 5
Ireland 28 68 35 11.32 0.44 7
Italy 50 70 75 12.54 0.25 5 1.5 2
Japan 54 95 92 5.68 0.18 6 3 3
Netherlands 38 14 53 4.90 0.42 10 2 4
New Zealand 31 8 50 8.35 0.24 3 1 3
Norway 22 58 49 12.02 0.17 2 2
Sweden 31 5.0 29 8.37 0.29 2 2
Switzerland 34 70 58 4.02 0.59 12 4 5
U.K. 35 66 35 10.28 0.27 6 2 2
U.S. 40 62 46 6.47 0.48 12 3 3
Mean
St. Deviation
No. Observations 18 15 16 17
Legenda
PDI Power Distance Index
MAS Masculinity
UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index
Cuk Index of central bank independence calculated by Cukierman
GMT Index of central bank independence derived by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
AI Index of central bank independence calculated by Alesina









    (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)   (g) (h) (i)
Constant 9.304 0.701 88.17 8.24 4.27 9.33 8.47 10.52 10.63
term (5.550) (0.29) (3.54) (6.27) (1.87) (4.88) (4.61) (7.94) (3.08)
         
Power 0.078 0.046 0.117 0.011 0.127 -0.016 -0.027 0.206 0.086 0.086
Distance (1.00) (0.84) (2.01) (0.18) (2.33) (0.40) (0.33) (3.51) (1.04) (1.40)
Uncertainty -.085 -.056 -.104 -.081 -.113 -.129 -.018 -.174 -.086 -.137
Avoidance (1.69) (1.60) (2.88) (1.66) (2.74) (3.98) (0.32)  (4.04)     (1.76) (3.32)
                      
Masculinity .001 .046 .004 .027 .043 .019 -.015 .085 .005 .055
(0.04) (2.74) (0.22) (0.93) (1.76) (0.83) (0.51) (2.96) (0.21) (2.65)
Additional 1.77 -20.12 1.52 6.90 1.13 0.081 -4.11 -.024 6.62





R2(adjusted) 0.058 0.49 0.45 0.35 0.37 0.50 0.45 0.56 0.04 0.64
F-statistic 1.349 5.016 4.52 3.25 3.45 5.26 4.53 6.31 1.15 7.14
P-value 0.30 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.38 0.00
Variable added: (a) Average inflation 1948-72; (b) Log income per capita in 1980; (c) Coups
and revolutions; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Left; (f) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (g)
Exchange rate system; (h) Openness; (j)Checks and balances: strong (in the row Additional
variable), weak, and no checks and balances, respectively.   










P-values of cultural variables (number of cases)
P<1% 1%<P<5% 5%<P<10% P>10%
Power Distance    5         7         5    28
Uncertainty Avoidance    25        10         5     5






Cukierman Grilli c.s. AI E&S Inflation
total inst app fin cons. total pol. econ.
Cukierman
total 1.0 0.61 0.20 0.82 0.56 0.79 0.73 0.52 0.62 0.55 -.56
instrument 1.0 0.04 0.38 0.15 0.52 0.35 0.49 0.58 0.44 -.59
appointment 1.0 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.02 -.05 -.38 0.11
financial 1.0 0.27 0.70 0.44 0.70 0.42 0.28 -.48
conservative 1.0 0.31 0.49 -.02 0.08 0.43 -.16
Grilli
total 1.0 0.82 0.78 0.68 0.38 -.63
political 1.0 0.28 0.50 0.41 -.37
economic 1.0 0.59 0.19 -.65
Alesina 1.0 0.69 -.70
E&S 1.0 -.68
t-statistic  -2.70 -2.93 0.45 -2.16 -.63 -2.91 -1.42 -3.12 -3.68 -3.59
Note. Each correlation or regression is calculated for as much observations as are available of
the variables concerned. This implies that the correlation between the sub-indices of the
Cukierman-index are based on 18 observations, and that between the Cukierman-indices and 
the indices of Grilli c.s. are based on 15 observations. 
The t-statistic in the last row refers to the t-statistic of the index of central bank independence
in the regression of inflation on a constant term and the index of central bank independence










Cukierman Grilli c.s. AI E&S
total app inst fin cons. total pol. econ.
   (a)  (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k)
Constant   16.90 8.53 11.64 8.57 9.22 16.05 15.26 10.90 14.19 14.86 14.69
term  (11.52) (4.63) (7.07) (5.73) (3.89) (7.39) (9.60) (7.76) (9.67) (9.03) (9.81)
         
Power  -0.039 0.073 -0.091 0.040 0.053 -0.056 0.104 0.119 0.168 -0.827 -0.081
Distance  (1.29) (0.98) (1.83) (0.58) (0.61) (0.81) (2.03) (1.87) (2.91) (1.31) (1.50)
Uncertainty   -.071 -.082 -.008 -.055 -.068 -.053 -.131 -.122 -.147 -.005 .034
Avoidance  (2.97) (1.66) (0.26) (1.25) (1.13) (1.42) (3.86) (2.61) (4.37) (0.16) (0.90)
Masculinity   .042 .002 .036 .004 .006 .056 .051 .025 .033 .056 -.020
 (2.79) (0.08) (2.34) (0.18) (0.17) (2.38) (3.61) (1.40) (2.01) (2.77) (1.46)
Central bank  -15.36 0.49 -4.37 0.39 0.32 -1.04 -0.82 -0.79 -1.23 -2.87 -1.73
independence  (7.27) (0.73) (4.68) (0.80) (0.37) (3.63) (6.38) (3.73) (6.50) (5.49) (5.68)
Conservative -1.76
(1.06)
R2(adjusted) 0.78 0,06 0.64 0.01 -0.16 0.49 0.84 0.55 0.80 0.74 0.84
F-statistic 15.62 1,26 8.63 1.04 0.42 4.32 18.71 5.28 15.33 11.82 18.71
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.79 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variable added: (a) Cukierman; (b) Appointment; (c) Instrument; (d) Conservative; (e)
Financial; (f) Sum of appointment, instrument and financial; conservative as a single variable;










  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 0.514 0.468 0.586 0.538 0.529 0.461
term (4.43) (3.15)   (4.87)  (4.75)  (4.44) (4.29) 
Power -.006 -.007 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.009 -.007
Distance (1.58) (1.59) (1.09) (1.18) (1.44) (2.53)  (2.82)
Uncertainty -.002 0.001 -.002 0.001 -.000 0.002 -.003
Avoidance (0.07) (0.217) (0.66) (0.36) (0.07) (0.78 ) (1.42)
Masculinity 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -.001 -.000
(0.88) (0.73) (1.39) (0.85) (0.75) (0.51) (0.39)
Additional 0.008 -.003 -.003 -.019 -.139 0.638





R2(adjusted) 0.14 0.09 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.31 0.64
F -statistic 1.89 1.41 2.15 2.04 2.86 1.55 7.04
P-value 0.18 0.28 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.00
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 






Constant 0.568 0.545 0.618 0.605 0.583 0.483
term (5.98) (4.86) (6.02) (6.20) (6.01) (5.28)
Power -.005 -.006 -.005 -.003 -.005 -.007 -.004
Distance (2.25) (2.23) (2.20) (1.13) (1.80) (3.11) (2.50)
Additional 0.005 -.002 -.025 -.020 0.116 0.667





R2(adjusted) 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.37 0.63
F -statistic 5.05 2.48 3.32 3.46 2.91 4.08 5.97
P-value 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.01
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively.
 Figures between brackets are the absolute values of the  t-statistics.
  	 '	 





P-values of cultural variables (number of cases)
P<1% 1%<P<5% 5%<P<10% P>10%
Power Distance    7         2         4    3 









  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 1.742 1.481 1.444 1.811 1.600 1.708
term (2.99) (2.00)    (2.33) (3.04) (2.67)    (2.81)
Power .004 -.002 -.003 .008 -.005 .003 -.000
Distance (0.24) (0.10) (0.16) (0.44) (0.25) (0.17) (0.01)
Uncertainty -0.013 -0.081 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 -0.014 -0.009
Avoidance (0.95) (0.48) (0.41) (0.66) (0.47) (0.97) (0.58)
Masculinity 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.014
(2.27) (2.04) (1.75) (2.20) (1.18) (2.23) (1.61)
Additional .045 .013 -.086 .369 .046 2.209





R2(adjusted) 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.08
F -statistic 1.76 1.35 1.76 1.44 1.57 1.28 1.31
P-value 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.33 0.32
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 









  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 0.294 0.292 0.586 0.360 0.148 0.372
term (0.73) (0.56)    (4.87) (0.89) (0.37)    (0.93)
Power -.023 -.023 -.004 -.019 -.033 -.021 -.025
Distance (1.89) (1.58) (1.09) (1.52) (2.47) (1.74) (2.28)
Uncertainty 0.018 0.019 -0.002 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.026
Avoidance (1.91) (1.57) (0.66) (2.16) (2.45) (2.16) (2.88)
Masculinity 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.003
(0.23) (0.21) (1.40) (0.18) (0.76) (0.04) (0.57)
Additional .000 -.003 -.082 -.379 -.104 0.512





R2(adjusted) 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.35
F -statistic 1.90 1.32 2.15 1.75 2.16 1.94 2.86






  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 0.323 0.306 0.772 0.384 0.118 0.377
term (0.40) (0.55)    (2.19) (1.03) (0.30)    (1.04)
Power -.024 -.024 -.018 -.020 -.028 -.021 -.023
Distance (2.07) (1.80) (1.80) (1.66) (2.42) (1.86) (2.27)
Uncertainty 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.023 0.020 0.021 0.023
Avoidance (2.39) (2.03) (2.06) (2.65) (2.53) (2.61) (3.15)
Additional .003 -.015 -.083 .264 -.104 0.409





R2(adjusted) 0.19 0.13 0.43 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.39
F -statistic 3.02 1.88 5.31 2.50 2.77 2.79 3.69
P-value 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.03
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 








  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 3.437 3.423 3.836 3.690 2.978 3.653
term (3.94) (3.04)    (4.09) (4.71) (3.91)    (4.46)
Power -.031 -.031 -.021 -.016 -.060 -.025 -.041
Distance (1.16) (0.98) (0.77) (0.65) (0.12) (0.99) (2.00)
Uncertainty -0.017 -0.016 -0.026 -0.004 0.003 -0.011 0.002
avoidance (0.27) (0.65) (1.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.54) (0.15)
Masculinity 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.018 -0.002 0.016 0.005
(1.55) (1.45) (1.84) (1.64) (0.70) (1.40) (0.50)
Additional .024 -.017 -.313 1.191 -.287 4.622





R2(adjusted) 0.21 0.15 0.22 0.37 0.43 0.32 0.54
F -statistic 2.50 1.74 2.20 3.54 4.19 2.96 5.04
P- value 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and



















  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 0.830 0.459 0.804 0.825 0.820 0.804
term (3.41) (1.75)    (2.95) (3.24) (3.16)    (3.21)
Power -.012 -.021 -.013 -.012 -.013 -.013 -.012
Distance (1.65) (2.84) (1.59) (1.57) (1.49) (1.70) (1.71)
Uncertainty 0.002 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.005
Avoidance (0.38) (1.62) (0.43) (0.31) (0.40) (0.25) (0.90)
Masculinity -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.80) (1.41) (0.81) (0.76) (0.70) (0.67) (1.20)
Additional .064 .001 -.006 .026 .034 0.806





R2(adjusted) 0.11 0.33 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.26
F -statistic 1.66 3.06 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.32 2.22
P-value 0.22 0.06 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.12
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 








  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 4.897 4.806 5.409 5.642 4.277 4.909
term (4.13) (3.45)    (4.80) (5.57) (4.99)    (5.49)
Power -.023 -.054 .012 .002 -.090 .014 -.037
Distance (0.43) (0.84) (0.25) (0.05) (2.19) (0.32) (1.45)
Uncertainty -0.020 -0.009 -0.050 -0.003 0.022 -0.024 0.008
Avoidance (0.53) (0.21) (1.38) (0.11) (0.76) (0.80) (0.43)
Masculinity 0.040 0.045 0.062 0.042 -0.004 0.047 0.007
(2.52) (2.76) (3.46) (3.15) (0.24) (3.85) (0.97)
Additional .107 -.048 -.553 2.491 -.587 7.473





R2(adjusted) 0.22 0.26 0.40 0.52 0.69 0.57 0.85
F -statistic 2.56 2.51 3.78 5.52 10.33 6.73 20.07
P-value 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 







  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 9.638 9.587 15.248 13.684 6.426 8.599
term (4.32) (1.77)    (5.70) (5.19) (3.95)    (5.87)
Power -.049 .012 .044 -.100 -.084 .040 -.039
Distance (0.47) (0.16) (1.02) (1.30) (2.35) (1.15) (0.71)
Uncertainty -0.019 -0.063 -0.100 0.091 0.021 -0.035 0.097
Avoidance (0.24) (1.06) (2.83) (1.76) (0.69) (0.85) (2.95)
Masculinity 0.048 0.049 0.034 -0.013 -0.019 0.053 -0.028
(1.19) (1.08) (0.92) (0.38) (0.73) (1.68) (1.56)
Additional -.025 -.144 -.313 3.898 -.862 9.675





R2(adjusted) 0.10 -0.00 0.73 0.71 0.52 0.42 0.91
F -statistic 1.54 1.00 10.50 9.58 4.71 3.54 30.93
P-value 0.26 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 









  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 3.857 5.59 6.623 6.170 2.342 3.748
term (2.64) (2.59)    (2.48) (3.31) (1.96)    (3.02)
Power -.083 -.031 -.044 -.083 -.068 -.057 -.046
Distance (1.39) (0.43) (0.66) (1.57) (1.43) (0.91) (0.85)
Uncertainty 0.035 -0.009 -0.019 0.056 0.025 0.003 0.052
Avoidance (0.79) (0.16) (0.46) (1.44) (0.71) (0.07) (1.24)
Masculinity 0.021 0.026 0.021 -0.000 0.005 0.036 -0.007
(0.93) (1.18) (0.60) (0.00) (0.28) (1.53) (0.41)
Additional -.240 -.046 -.529 1.565 .035 3.986





R2(adjusted) 0.10 0.18 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.14 0.00
F -statistic 1.59 1.76 3.40 2.86 2.89 1.57 6.92
P-value 0.27 0.21 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.01
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 










  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 4.816 6.163 8.375 5.143 3.419 4.735
term (2.93) (1.90)    (6.29) (5.43) (2.78)    (5.70)
Power -.007 -.002 .016 .028 -.053 .036 .003
Distance (0.15) (0.02) (0.52) (0.99) (1.08) (0.89) (0.09)
Uncertainty -0.008 -0.022 -0.062 0.026 0.019 -0.011 0.017
Avoidance (0.24) (0.32) (2.61) (1.25) (0.60) (0.39) (0.77)
Masculinity 0.021 0.026 0.037 0.022 -0.014 0.026 0.006
(0.94) (1.14) (4.08) (1.95) (0.75) (2.10) (0.55)
Additional -.100 -.072 -.757 3.572 -.552 5.430





R2(adjusted) -0.16 -0.12 0.74 0.61 0.40 0.54 0.78
F -statistic 0.35 0.64 11.11 6.51 3.33 5.05 10.72
P-value 0.79 0.65 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 







  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 1.822 2.370 2.284 1.960 1.486 1.829
term (2.65) (2.76)    (3.67) (2.95) (2.12)    (2.79)
Power -.024 .002 -.007 -.024 -.077 -.018 -.049
Distance (0.77) (0.06) (0.26) (0.80) (2.14) (0.60) (1.77)
Uncertainty 0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.025 0.055 0.020 0.039
Avoidance (0.48) (0.18) (0.01) (1.07) (2.01) (0.93) (1.84)
Masculinity 0.015 0.015 0.019 0.014 -0.015 0.009 0.014
(1.59) (1.53) (2.22) (1.44) (0.87) (0.89) (1.61)
Additional -.129 -.029 -.181 1.075 -.239 1.743





R2(adjusted) 0.06 0.07 0.31 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.37
F -statistic 1.32 1.28 2.68 1.60 1.94 1.63 2.74
P-value 0.31 0.34 0.09 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.08
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively. 








  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)   (f)
Constant 3.163 3.373  3.322 2.470 2.901 3.625
term (3.26) (1.77)    (3.22) (2.55) (3.47)    (4.02)
Power -.072 -.034 -.038 -.054 -.140 -.066 -.044
Distance (1.74) (0.45) (0.74) (1.39) (3.27) (1.83) (1.18)
Uncertainty 0.050 0.031 0.034 0.068 0.106 0.081     0.048
Avoidance (1.69) (0.63) (1.07) (2.23) (3.24) (2.73) (1.88)
Masculinity -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 -0.055 -0.033 3.057
(0.58) (0.92) (0.40) (0.92) (2.64) (1.96) (3.09)
Additional -.101 -.029 -.220 1.767 -.649 2.789





R2(adjusted) 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.33 0.21 0.38
F- statistic 1.08 0.79 1.12 1.26 2.94 2.09 1.08
P -value 0.39 0.55 0.39 0.34 0.07 0.15 0.42
Variable added: (a) Equilibrium unemployment; (b) Debt/GDP (%) 1975; (c) Change of
government; (d) Significant change of government; (e) Exchange rate system; (f) checks and
balances: strong (in the row Additional variable), weak, and no checks and balances,
respectively.
 Figures between brackets are the absolute values of the t-statistics.








theory Cukierman Grilli c.s.                   AI E&S T
total app inst fin cons. total pol. econ.
Power - 7 4 1 1 1 1 1 16
Distance 0
Uncertainty + 11 1 1 3 16
Avoidance 1 1 2
Masculinity 0 1 1
4 2 1 7






1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Exchange + 1 1
Rate Mech. 1 1 1 1 4
Checks & + 2 1 1 1 1 1 7
balances 
There are two rows for each explanatory variable. The first row lists the number of significant
coefficients that have the theoretically expected sign. The second row lists the number of
significant coefficients which are wrongly signed. Since no influence of  Masculinity was
expected, the first row of Masculinity lists the number of negative coefficients and the second
row the number of positive coefficients 
